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Summary
The pending Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade
agreement has raised controversy, fueled by leaks of
the draft text and congressional debate over fast-track
negotiation authority. Like similar agreements, the
TPP creates the risk of government liability for enacting regulations, especially new or comprehensive measures to address climate change. This Article analyzes
how the TPP’s investor protection provisions and dispute settlement mechanism might be invoked to challenge climate change policy. The author concludes
that the negotiators’ efforts to date are insufficient to
protect climate measures from the risk of liability, and
suggests reforms to the draft text.
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I.

Introduction

The Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade and Globalization
Agreement (TPP) is currently being negotiated by the
United States and 11 other Pacific Rim countries: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New
Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. With 29 chapters in the document, the TPP addresses much more than
trade: It will also set binding policy related to investment,
intellectual property, technological barriers to trade and,
most importantly for readers of the Environmental Law
Reporter, the environment. If negotiations are successful,
this mega-treaty will be the largest free-trade agreement to
date, initially governing 40% of the world’s gross domestic
product (GDP) and 26% of the world’s trade. The agreement will be open for other Pacific Rim countries to join
over time.1
Many scholars have expressed concern that fair trade
agreements (FTAs) and other international investment
agreements (IIAs) create a threat of government liability
for measures undertaken to address climate change.2 This
Article examines whether the TPP investment chapter
adequately shields governments from the risk of liability
for climate change policies. TPP negotiations are confidential, and negotiating parties have not released any official
working drafts of the agreement; however, private organizations have leaked two drafts of the investment chapter,
first in June 2012 and then in March 2015.3 These drafts
are assumed to be genuine for purposes of the Article.
IIAs are intended to encourage foreign investment
through the development of a legal scheme that protects
foreign investors from certain government actions that
negatively affect their investments. To achieve this goal,
modern IIAs impose standards of conduct on host countries in their dealings with foreign investors, and usually
establish an investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism. The ISDS mechanism permits aggrieved investors
to initiate arbitration in ad hoc international tribunals for
compensation for losses that arose from the host country’s violation of the investor protection provisions. Any
damages awarded are paid out of the liable government’s
national treasury.
While it is generally agreed that host countries should
be held to certain standards of treatment regarding foreign
1.
2.
3.

See generally Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), Trans-Pacific
Partnership Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.ustr.gov/tpp (last visited
Feb. 11, 2014).
See generally Lise Johnson, Investor-State Contracts, Host State “Commitments,” 24 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 361, 367 (2013).
Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade and Globalization Agreement (TPP) Investment Chapter (Jan. 20, 2015 draft; leaked Mar. 2015), available at www.
citizenstrade.org/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/tppinvestment.pdf. The
website also leaked the 2012 draft, available at http://www.citizenstrade.
org/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/tppinvestment.pdf.
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investors, the ISDS mechanism has been heavily criticized
for allowing investors to challenge government policies
intended to protect public health and the environment.4
To date, governments have paid out substantial damage
awards under the United States’ IIAs alone; over one-half
of the awards pertain to natural resource, environmental, and energy policies.5 According to an open letter by a
group of over 100 academics, judges, practicing attorneys,
and legislators advocating the exclusion of ISDS from the
TPP, that figure is as high as 70%.6
A few particularly salient examples of arbitration spurred
by public interest regulations are currently pending. Vattenfall AB, a Swedish energy company, has initiated arbitration under the Energy Charter Treaty in response to
Germany’s decision to phase out nuclear energy in the
wake of the Fukushima disaster.7 While the arbitration
documents have been confidential, the German Federal
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy revealed that
the claim is for $6 billion dollars.8 This suit comes on the
heels of Vattenfall’s 2009 suit against Germany alleging
that the restrictive water quality standards in an environmental permit issued for the company’s coal-fired power
plant would make the project “uneconomical.”9 Vattenfall
initially sought 1.4 billion Euros in damages plus arbitra4.	

5.	

6.	

7.	

8.	

9.	

In 2012 alone, over 500 treaty-based arbitrations were initiated. See United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: In Search of a Roadmap
No. 2 (2013) [hereinafter UNCTAD, Roadmap].
See Public Citizen, Table of Foreign Investor-State Cases and Claims Under
NAFTA and Other U.S. “Trade” Deals (Feb. 2014) [hereinafter Public Citizen Trade Chart], available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/investorstate-chart.pdf (referencing the following disputes addressing environmental, natural resource, and energy policies: Ethyl Corp. v Canada, NAFTA
UNCITRAL (1998) ($13 million settlement due to methylcyclopentadienyl
manganese tricarbonyl (MMT) export ban); S.D. Myers v. Canada, NAFTA
UNCITRAL (2002) ($5.6 million award for temporary polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) ban); Pope & Talbot v. Canada, NAFTA UNCITRAL (2002)
($500,000 for lumber agreement with United States); Abitibi-Bowater v.
Canada, NAFTA (2010) ($122 million settlement for removal of timber
and water rights after closing of paper mill); Metalclad v. Mexico, NAFTA
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (2000) ($15.6 million award for closure of
landfill of hazardous wastes); St. Mary VCNA v. Canada, NAFTA (2013)
($15 million settlement for delayed permitting process for rock quarrying);
Tampa Elec. Co. (TECO) Holdings v. Guatemala, CAFTA ISCID Case
No. ARB/10/23 (2013) ($25 million award for lowering electricity rates
that a private utility could charge); TCW Grp. v. Dominican Republic,
CAFTA UNCITRAL (2009) ($26.5 settlement for failure to raise electricity
rates)). All but one of the remaining successful cases listed in Public Citizen’s
chart were brought in response to public health policies. Id.
Letter from Retired Justice Elizabeth A. Evatt et al., to Negotiators of the
Trans-Pacific Partnership Urging Rejection of Investor-State Dispute Settlement at 3 (May 8, 2012), available at https://tpplegal.wordpress.com/
open-letter/.
See Vattenfall AB v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No.
ARB/12/12, http://www.italaw.com/cases/documents/1655; IISD News in
Brief, Investment Treaty News, July 19, 2012; Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder & Rhea Tamara Hoffmann, Int’l Inst. for Sustainable Dev.,
The German Nuclear Phase-Out Put to the Test in International Investment
Arbitration? Background to the New Dispute Vattenfall v. Germany (II) 2
(June 2012).
See Alexander Hellemans, Vattenfall Seeks $6 Billion in Compensation for German Nuclear Phase-Out, IEEE Spectrum, Nov. 12, 2014, http://spectrum.
ieee.org/energywise/energy/nuclear/swedish-energy-giant-vattenfall-netsbillions-for-nuclear-phaseout.
See Vattenfall AB v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No.
ARB/09/6, Request for Arbitration (Mar. 30, 2009).
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tion costs, but settled the suit when the government agreed
to watered-down standards.10
Another example arose in Canada when Quebec
imposed a moratorium on shale gas exploration and production due to concerns over drinking water contamination. The oil and gas exploration company Lone Pine
Resources, Inc. brought suit seeking over $250 million
in compensation under the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA)11 for the revocation of its gas exploration and production permit.12 While Vattenfall and Lone
Pine are still pending, the sheer size of the damage awards
being sought demonstrates the substantial financial risk
that ISDS can create for countries taking action to protect
public health and the environment.
Critics of ISDS argue that the risk of liability constrains
governments’ fundamental responsibility to protect public
health and welfare.13 In May 2012, a group of lawyers and
scholars, led by retired Australian judge Elizabeth Evatt,
sent an open letter to TPP negotiators urging the rejection
of ISDS, arguing that ISDS “threatens to undermine the
justice systems in [member] countries and fundamentally
shift the balance of power between investors, states and
other affected parties.”14 Compensation for the economic
impacts of environmental regulation is a particularly
troublesome issue. Rooted in the “polluter-pays” principle,
environmental regulation aims to shift the costs of environmental harm to the responsible entity. To compensate
an investor for lost profits shifts the costs of regulation back
onto the public, essentially turning the polluter-pays principle on its head.15 In most cases, investors claim damages
of tens or hundreds of millions of dollars.16 In practice,
these payments may make regulatory measures cost-prohibitive, especially in an era marked by austerity.
Because of the high price associated with ISDS, many
critics worry that investors may use the ISDS mechanism
as a strategic tool to attack regulations that negatively
affect their investments.17 For example, efforts to discourage tobacco smoking, one of the leading causes of preventable deaths, led Australia and Uruguay to pass legislation
requiring plain packaging of cigarettes.18 Tobacco giant
10. See Bernasconi-Osterwalder & Hoffman, supra note 7, at 4.
11. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289 (1993) (NAFTA).
12. See Lone Pine Resources, Inc. v. Canada, Notice of Intent to Submit a
Claim to Arbitration Under Chapter 11 of NAFTA (Nov. 8, 2012), available at http://www.italaw.com/cases/documents/1607.
13. See Vicki Been & Joel Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment: NAFTA’s Investment Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International Regulatory
Takings Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 30, 132 (2003); Samrat Ganguly, The
Investor-State Dispute Mechanism (ISDM) and a Sovereign’s Power to Protect
Public Health, 38 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 113, 119 (1999) (“The prospect
of crushing liability claims or the chilling effect of the number and size of
claims that may result under ISDMs can deter governments from legislating
in the interest of the public.”).
14. Letter from Retired Justice Elizabeth A. Evatt et al., supra note 6, at 1.
15. J. Martin Wagner, International Investment, Expropriation, and Environmental Protection, 29 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 465, 471 (1999).
16. See Public Citizen Trade Chart, supra note 5.
17. See Marc R. Poirier, The NAFTA Chapter 11 Expropriation Debate Through
the Eyes of a Property Theorist, 33 Envtl. L. 851, 852-53 (2003).
18. Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Austl.); Ministry of Public Health Ordinance No. 514 (Uruguay).
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Phillip Morris responded by initiating arbitration in both
countries, seeking an injunction and lost profits potentially in the billions of dollars.19 The threat of investment
arbitration is widely believed to have played an important
part in deterring the Canadian government from adopting
tobacco plain packaging laws in the 1990s.20 Philip Morris’ attack on the Australian legislation led New Zealand’s
government to announce in early 2013 that it will delay
implementation of its plain packaging laws until the dispute is resolved.21
Due to concerns over the chilling effect of ISDS on
public interest regulation, the Australian government
announced in 2011 that it would not submit to ISDS under
the TPP. A government-issued trade statement noted that
Australia could not “support provisions that would constrain the ability of Australian governments to make laws
on social, environmental and economic matters in circumstances where those laws do not discriminate between
domestic and foreign businesses.”22 Australia is not alone
in its concern over ISDS. South Africa announced in 2012
that it would not renew its existing bilateral investment
treaty (BIT) with the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union
and that it intended to revoke a number of other BITs with
European partners.23 Indonesia has also announced that
it intends to terminate more than 60 BITs.24 In addition,
the European Commission temporarily suspended trade
negotiations with the United States to conduct public
consultations on ISDS.25 Nonetheless, a draft of the TPP
investment chapter leaked in March 2015 revealed that all
countries party to the TPP negotiations, except for Australia, have thus far agreed to submit to ISDS.26
Climate change regulation is particularly vulnerable
to ISDS attacks because, compared to many other areas
of environmental law, climate policy is very much in its
infancy. As climate policy evolves, it can be expected to
impact a broad range of investments. For example, emis19. See Notice of Arbitration Australia: Hong Kong Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investment (Nov. 21, 2011), available at http://www.
italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0665.pdf; Philip Morris
Brands Sàri, v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7,
Request for Arbitration (Feb. 19, 2010).
20. Mathew Porterfield & Christopher Byrnes, Philip Morris v. Uruguay: Will
Investor-State Arbitration Send Restrictions on Tobacco Marketing Up in
Smoke?, IISD Investment Treaty News, July 12, 2011.
21. Joe Schneider, New Zealand Follows Australia on Tobacco Plain Packs,
Bloomberg News, Feb. 19, 2013.
22. Gillard Gov’t, Trade Policy Statement: Trading Our Way to More
Jobs and Prosperity 14 (2011). However, Australia’s position may shift
since the new Liberal-National coalition has loosened its stance on ISDS.
See IISD, Australia Changes Position on Investor-State Arbitration in Free
Trade Agreement With Korea, News in Brief, Jan. 19, 2014.
23. Open letter from Sidwell Medupe, Spokesman, South Africa Department of
Trade and Industry, Letter: Critical Issues Ignored (Oct. 1, 2012), http:www.
bdlive.co.za/opinion/letters/2012/10/01/letter-critical-issues-ignored.
24. Netherlands Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia, Termination Bilateral Investment Treaty, http://indonesia.nlembassy.org/organization/departments/
economic-affairs/termination-bilateral-investment-treaty.html (last visited
May 19, 2014).
25. International Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev., EU Temporarily Suspends Investment Part of U.S. Trade Talks Bridges, 18 Bridges, Jan. 23, 2014,
http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/eu-temporarily-suspendsinvestment-part-of-us-trade-talks.
26. TTP Investment Chapter, supra note 3, at §B.
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sions standards may require power plants and other carbonintensive industries to install new technologies and may lead
to early closure of some facilities. Additionally, adaptation
measures such as setbacks from coastlines will likely result
in new limits on property use. Measures adopted after the
ratification of the TPP would be subject to challenge under
investor protection provisions. The financial repercussions
of ISDS may further deter timely action to combat climate
change. The most recent reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) make clear that the
repercussions of delay could be grave.27
This Article analyzes the leaked investment chapter to
assess the risk of governmental liability for climate change
measures under the TPP. Part II discusses the investor
protection provisions included in the TPP draft and how
they might be invoked to challenge climate policy. Part III
examines whether the TPP draft provides language to prevent liability for climate change measures by including an
exception for measures taken to protect the environment
or in compliance with international obligations. Part IV
discusses how the structure of ISDS contributes to the risk
of liability, and assesses whether the TPP draft includes
proposed reforms to reduce this risk. The Article concludes
that, while the draft text demonstrates an effort on the part
of TPP negotiators to reduce the risk of liability for legitimate regulations promulgated in the public interest, the
efforts are insufficient to protect climate change measures
from the risk of liability under the TPP.

II.

Investor Protection Provisions

The leaked draft of the TPP investment chapter includes
four main investor protection provisions that could be
invoked to challenge measures taken by a member country
to address climate change. The chapter provides an expropriation provision to ensure compensation for all takings
and three additional provisions imposing a standard of
conduct on host countries in their dealings with foreign
investors: The fair and equitable treatment (FET) obligation sets a minimum standard of treatment of all foreign
investors; and the national treatment and most-favored
nation (MFN) obligations prevent discrimination against
foreign investors. (The national treatment principle prohibits favoring domestic investors, while the MFN principle
prohibits favoring investors from one nation over another.)
This part discusses each of these TPP obligations in turn.

A.

Expropriation

Expropriation provisions require host countries to compensate investors for the taking of private property. Consistent with previous IIAs, the TPP prohibits a Party from
expropriating a foreign investor’s property unless the action
27. See generally Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
WGIII AR5, Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change,
Summary for Policymakers (2014); IPCC WGII AR5, Climate Change
2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability Summary for Policymakers (2014).
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is: (1) for a public purpose; (2) nondiscriminatory; (3) in
accordance with due process of the law; and (4) compensated to the investor.28 Expropriation may be direct or indirect.29 A direct expropriation occurs when a government
nationalizes or transfers the title of an investor’s property.
An indirect expropriation, also known as a regulatory taking, refers to measures tantamount to an expropriation
that do not involve formal transfer of ownership. Where a
government action constitutes an expropriation, a foreign
investor is entitled to compensation equivalent to “the fair
market value of the expropriated investment immediately
before the expropriation took place.”30
Climate-related measures are at risk of constituting an
indirect expropriation if they interfere with foreign investments. Regulations such as an emissions standard, adaptation requirement, or greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions tax,
could arguably constitute an indirect expropriation if they
result in tax increases, the denial of a necessary operational
permit, or even failed contract negotiations.31 For example,
an expropriation could occur in the context of managed
retreat. As sea level rises and coastal property becomes
more vulnerable to flooding and storm damage, governments may bar most uses of the area to allow for coastal
buffer zones and obviate the need for repetitive government
disaster relief.32 If a foreign investor purchases coastal property for the purpose of erecting a resort hotel, and subsequently the government decides to ban construction there
because of sea-level rise, the investors could initiate arbitration seeking damages, including lost profits.
Under some previous IIAs, tribunals have found that
the impacts of environmental and health regulations constitute an expropriation in a number of disputes.33 The likelihood of such a finding in the context of climate change
is heavily dependent on the test employed to determine
what constitutes an indirect expropriation. Because tribunals have adopted divergent approaches, governments have
faced substantial uncertainty in their risk of liability.34

1.

2012 Leaked Text

In the earlier version of the investment chapter leaked in
2012, TPP negotiators had responded to this issue by proposing two alternate interpretative annexes clarifying how
to determine what actions constitute an expropriation.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

TPP Investment Chapter, supra note 3, art. 11.7.1.
Id.
Id. art. 11.7.2.
Johnson, supra note 2, at 11151.
New York Governor Mario Cuomo initiated a voluntary buyout program
in 2013 for homes in certain areas devastated by Hurricane Sandy and particularly vulnerable to future floods. While this program was voluntary, it is
possible that as sea-level rise continues, governments will begin to initiate
mandatory programs. See Anne Siders, Managed Coastal Retreat: A
Legal Handbook on Shifting Development Away From Vulnerable
Areas (2013).
33. See, e.g., Tecnicas Medioambientales v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/00/2 [hereinafter Tecmed] (May 29, 2003); Metalclad v.
Mexico, NAFTA ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (2000).
34. Daniel M. Firger & Michael B. Gerrard, Harmonizing Climate Change Policy and International Investment Law: Threats, Challenges, and Opportunities,
in Y.B. Int’l Investment L. & Pol’y 2010-2011 542 (2012).
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While the language of each proposal was slightly different,
both annexes stated that a legitimate exercise of state police
powers to protect public welfare, including public health
and the environment, will not constitute an indirect expropriation except in rare circumstances.35
The key issue for climate change regulation is how the
proposed annexes address what constitutes “rare circumstances.” Annex 12-C does not provide any guidance on
the term; thus, if Annex 12-C were adopted, tribunals
would likely choose to interpret the term based on arbitral practice. Many tribunals follow the rule adopted by
the tribunal in the 2005 Methanex v. United States award,
and require the claimant to show that the host state made
“specific commitments” to induce the investor to enter the
market or make the subject investment.36 The Methanex
tribunal reasoned that investors should be aware of the risk
of regulation, especially in highly regulated industries.37
Thus, a state should only be responsible for the impacts of
regulation on an investment where the investor had reasonably relied on specific commitments by the host state that it
would refrain from such regulation.38 Requiring a specific
commitment by the host state greatly limits the pool of
potential claimants for an expropriation claim; however,
the protection offered by this approach has been somewhat eroded by subsequent tribunals that have found that
a commitment can be implied, for example, by a statement
made by a government official.39
In addition, tribunals may look to the remaining language of the annex as a guide when determining what constitutes rare circumstances. Annex 12-C instructs tribunals
to conduct a case-by-case inquiry, taking into account
economic impact, the extent to which the government
action interferes with “distinct, reasonable, investmentbacked expectations,” and the character of the government
action.40 The outcome of this balancing approach will
be highly dependent on the specific tribunal. A tribunal
may find that a reasonable investor would foresee climate
change regulation. Alternatively, a tribunal might find that
the significant economic impact of climate change regulations are not justified given the minimal impact of a specific investor’s emissions on global climate change.
Annex 12-D provided guidance as to what may constitute rare circumstances, stating that an expropriation is
particularly likely where it is either: (a) discriminatory in
its effect, either as against the particular investor or against
a class of which the investor forms a part; or (b) in breach
of the state’s binding written commitment to the investor,
whether by contract, license or other legal document.41
35. TPP Investment Chapter, supra note 3, Annexes 12-C(4)(b) & 12-D(5).
36. Methanex v. United States, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, pt. IV, ch. D, ¶ 7 (Aug.
9, 2005), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/.
37. Id. ¶ 9.
38. Id. ¶ 7.
39. See Tecmed, supra note 33, ¶¶ 158-74; Metalclad v. Mexico, NAFTA ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (2000), ¶¶ 28-29.
40. TPP Investment Chapter, supra note 3, Annex 12-C(4)(a)(i)-(iii) (2012
draft).
41. Id., Annex 12-D(4)(a)-(b).
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Subsection (b) of Annex 12-D is an improvement over
Annex 12-C because it clarifies that a commitment must
be binding and written. This language essentially codifies the Methanex approach and reinforces the meaning of
“specific commitment” as a narrow exception by eliminating the potential for a mere permit or government statement to be interpreted as implying a commitment. The
requirement that the commitment be binding and written
requires a contractual relationship between the host state
and the investor, and thus reduces the potential for finding
an expropriation.
However, subsection (a) of Annex 12-D presented a new
issue of uncertainty. While expropriation provisions generally prohibit regulations from discriminating amongst
investors, a measure of general applicability is usually
accepted as nondiscriminatory for expropriation purposes.42 Subsection (a) specifically points to whether a measure is discriminatory in its effect. This new language may
impact the expropriation analysis. Climate change regulations are intended to be discriminatory in their effect,
favoring low-emissions technologies over carbon-intensive
technologies. Subsection (a) does not expressly require that
the prohibited provision be discriminatory against foreign
investors, only against a class of investors. Whether climate regulation is discriminatory in its effect will depend
on how a tribunal defines a class of investors. If a tribunal
considers all energy generators as belonging to one class
of investors, then regulations that disfavor carbon-intensive fuels could arguably be discriminatory in their effect
because they favor renewable units over fossil fuel units. A
more reasonable interpretation would be to only consider
a measure discriminatory in its effect if it discriminates on
the basis of nationality or between investors on arbitrary
grounds. This interpretation would be consistent with the
aim of IIAs to protect foreign investors without compromising states’ capacity to make their own policy choices.
However, the current language of Annex 12-D leaves this
determination to the discretion of the tribunal, thereby
creating a risk of liability for the host state.
Annex 12-D also included an alternate proposal that
removes the “except in rare circumstances” language. The
provision states: “Non-discriminatory regulatory actions
by a Party that are designed and applied to achieve legitimate public welfare objectives, such as the protection of
public health, safety, and the environment, shall not constitute indirect expropriation.”43 This blanket rule would
mean that no climate regulation could constitute an expropriation, regardless of the extent of its impact.

2.

2015 Leaked Text

In the 2015 leaked text, the negotiators have adopted an
annex that addresses some of the issues seen in Annexes
12-C and 12-D.44 The 2015 annex generally reflects the
42. Johnson, supra note 2, at 367.
43. TPP Investment Chapter, supra note 3, Annex 12-D(5) (2012 draft).
44. TPP Investment Chapter, supra note 3, Annex II B (Jan. 20, 2015, draft).
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language of Annex 12-C, but with a few key additions.
First, the annex includes a footnote stating that: “For
greater certainty, whether an investor’s investment-backed
expectations are reasonable depends, to the extent relevant,
on factors such as whether the government provided the
investor with binding written assurances and the nature
and extent of governmental regulation or the potential for
government regulation in the relevant sector.”45
This language does not go as far as Annex 12-D, because
a binding written assurance is not required but only a factor to be considered in determining whether investmentbacked expectations are reasonable. However, it nonetheless
provides further guidance for tribunals and suggests that a
tribunal should not find an expropriation occurred unless
there were specific assurances to warrant a finding that the
investor’s investment-backed expectations were reasonable.
Moreover, the 2015 annex as a whole decreases the risk of
successful expropriation claims by preventing tribunals
from adopting an approach that ignores the regulatory
measure’s purpose.46
Further, proposed footnote 34 in the definitions section clarifies that “a unilateral act of an administrative or
judicial authority, such as a permit, license, or authorization issued by a Party solely in its regulatory capacity, or a
subsidy or grant, or a decree, order, or judgment, standing
alone . . . shall not be considered a written agreement.”47
The inclusion of this footnote language constrains how a
tribunal may interpret what constitutes a specific commitment, and prevents a tribunal from watering down this
requirement by adopting an overly broad interpretation of
“specific commitment.”
In addition, the negotiators have added a provision to
the expropriation section to clarify what constitutes a taking. The provision provides that a Party’s decision not to
“issue, renew, or maintain a subsidy or grant” does not
alone constitute an expropriation so long as there was no
specific commitment under law or contract or the decision
is in accordance with such a law or contract.48 This provision also seems to speak to what constitutes “reasonable
investment-backed expectations.” Without a contract or
other commitment, an investor cannot reasonably expect
that it is guaranteed to continue receiving a subsidy. In the
context of climate change, this language prevents potential liability should a government decide, for example, to
end subsidies for fossil fuels. However, the language does
not necessarily protect a government from arbitration
similar to Vattenfall, because the language only extends
to subsidies or grants. The draft text does not provide the
same security to host states deciding not to renew a license
or permit.49
45. Id. at n.34.
46. See Metalclad v. Mexico, NAFTA ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (2000),
¶ 111 (stating that the motivation or intent of the government action is irrelevant in determining whether an expropriation occurred).
47. See TPP Investment Chapter, supra note 3, at 12-4 n.5 (Jan. 20, 2015 draft).
48. Id. art. 11.7.6.
49. In other places in the text, the negotiators have explicitly referred to subsidies and grants separately from the granting of licenses and permits. See TPP
Investment Chapter, supra note 3, at 12-4 n.5 (Jan. 20, 2015 draft) (“For
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The inclusion of the 2015 annex and clarifying language
suggests that foreign investors should not be able to utilize
the TPP as a sword to prevent the implementation of goodfaith climate change laws and regulations. In particular,
the “reasonable investment-backed expectations” language
would support a host state’s defending a climate change
action from an expropriation claim, on the ground that a
reasonable investor would anticipate climate-related measures given the current state of climate science. However,
in view of the inconsistency in arbitral practice and the fact
that tribunals are not bound by a principle of stare decisis,
the risk of liability still exists.50 Negotiators could further
reduce risk by removing the “except in rare circumstances”
language altogether, as was done in Annex 12-D of the
2012 leaked text.
If a host state were to face an expropriation claim under
the TPP for a climate-related measure, domestic property
law may bolster its defense. For example, under U.S. law,
property rights do not include the right to create a nuisance.51 Applying that rule in the United States, any climate
change measure that prevented certain land uses to protect
against the impacts of climate change would not be a taking if the impacted land use would have constituted a nuisance.52 Since the investor never had the right to create a
nuisance, the United States could argue that the measure
did not constitute an expropriation because it did not take
away a previously existing property right. Such an argument
would be supported under a general rule of international law
known as lex situs, which states that municipal or domestic
law defines the scope of property rights.53 According to Prof.
Zachary Douglas of the Graduate Institute of International
and Development Studies in Geneva, tribunals may even be
required to adhere to this rule.54
Moreover, failure to define the scope of property rights
based on domestic law would create an unfair advantage
for foreign investors over their domestic counterparts. If
a tribunal were to recognize property rights of foreign
investors not recognized by the host state, that recognition
might create an incentive for investors to place property in
the hands of foreign affiliates to allow for the possibility of
remedy under IIAs if climate-related property restrictions
were to be implemented.
The practical risk of a successful expropriation claim
may be further reduced in light of recent trends in arbi-

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

greater certainty, (a) a unilateral act of an administrative or judicial authority, such as a permit, license, or authorization issued by a Party solely in its
regulatory capacity, or a subsidy or grant, or a decree, order, or judgment,
standing alone . . . shall not be a written agreement.”). This language suggests that the negotiators did not intend for the term “grant” to include the
granting of a license or a permit.
See Firger & Gerrard, supra note 34, at 543.
See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1020, 22 ELR
21104 (1992).
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
See Cheshire, North & Fawcett, Private International Law 11991200 (2008).
Zachary Douglas, The International Law of Investment Claims 4445 (2009) (stating that there is “considerable authority for the proposition
that the application of the lex situs rule is even required by general international law”).
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tral practice. Recent tribunals have required a high level of
interference to support a finding that a government action
constituted an indirect expropriation.55 However, the effectiveness of this stricter standard in preventing state liability
is dependent on whether investors can successfully invoke
other investor protection provisions. Unlike the high standard for expropriation, the threshold for violating the FET
requirement, as discussed below, seems to be relatively
low.56 Thus, success under FET may offset the high standard for expropriation.

B.

FET

The second investor protection provision adopted in the
draft investment chapter requires Parties to accord all covered investments a minimum standard of treatment “in
accordance with customary international law, including
fair and equitable treatment . . . .”57 Although the FET
obligation can be found in virtually all IIAs, defining the
content of the standard has proven difficult.58 The difficulty is due in part to the fact that the terms “fair” and
“equitable” are intrinsically imprecise and contextual.59
One scholar, addressing the complexities of interpreting
the FET obligation, described the terms as “maddeningly
vague, frustratingly general, and treacherously elastic.”60
Also contributing to variations in application of the FET
standard are the differences in the language of the FET
provisions themselves. Some IIAs tie the FET obligation
to the minimum standard of treatment under customary
international law (CIL), while others do not. In the IIAs
that do not explicitly link FET to the minimum standard
of treatment, tribunals have disagreed as to whether there
is an autonomous FET obligation separate from CIL.61 The
TPP avoids this issue by explicitly tying the FET obligation to the minimum standard of treatment.62 However,
the extent to which the CIL standard has evolved over time
remains an issue for tribunals to address.
55. See, e.g., El Paso v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award (Oct.
31, 2011) (“A mere loss in value of the investment, even if important, is
not an indirect expropriation.”); cf. Kate Miles, Arbitrating Climate Change:
Regulatory Regimes and Investor-State Disputes, 1 Climate L. 63, 75 (2010).
56. Johnson, supra note 2, at 11152.
57. TPP Investment Chapter, supra note 3, art. 11.6 (Jan. 20, 2015 draft).
58. Kyla Tienhaara, Investor-State Dispute Settlement in the TransPacific Partnership Agreement, Submission to the Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade 9 (May 19, 2010), http://dfat.gov.au/trade/
agreements/tpp/submissions/Documents/tpp_sub_tienhaara_100519.pdf;
Jeswald Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties 218 (2010).
59. Rahim Moloo & Justin Jacinto, Environmental and Health Regulation: Assessing Liabilities Under Investment Treaties, 29 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 1, 38
(2011).
60. Salacuse, supra note 58, at 221.
61. UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment: UNCTAD Series on Issues
in International Investment Agreements II 21 (2012).
62. TPP Investment Chapter, supra note 3, art. 11.6.2 (Jan. 20, 2015 draft):
For greater certainty, paragraph 1 prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the
standard of treatment to be afforded to covered investments. The
concepts of “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and
security” do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that
which is required by that standard, and do not create additional
substantive rights.
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Tribunals initiated under NAFTA and the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade
Agreement (CAFTA), which also equate FET with the
CIL minimum standard, have disagreed about the current
status of CIL.63 In the 2009 case Glamis Gold v. United
States, the tribunal found no evidence that the CIL standard had evolved.64 Glamis Gold Ltd. initiated arbitration
under NAFTA alleging that state and federal regulatory
measures in response to concerns over the environmental and social impacts of a proposed gold mining project
violated the FET obligation. Citing the 1926 Neer arbitration award,65 the tribunal found that “an act must be sufficiently egregious and shocking—a gross denial of justice,
manifest arbitrariness, blatant unfairness, a complete lack
of due process, evident discrimination, or a manifest lack
of reasons” to constitute a breach of CIL.66
Most NAFTA tribunals, however, have disagreed with
Glamis Gold, finding that the modern CIL standard is
much broader than the standard defined in Neer.67 For
example, a number of tribunals have found that the CIL
has evolved to include requirements of transparency and
not to undermine the legitimate expectations of investors.68 In the 2004 decision Waste Management v. Mexico
(Waste Management II), the tribunal articulated a broad
standard based on a number of previous NAFTA tribunal awards:
[T]he minimum standard of treatment is infringed by
conduct attributable to the State and harmful to the
claimant if the conduct is arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust
or idiosyncratic, is discriminatory and exposes the claimant to sectional or racial prejudice, or involves a lack of
due process leading to an outcome which offends judicial
propriety—as might be the case with a manifest failure of
natural justice in judicial proceedings or a complete lack
of transparency and candor in an administrative process.
In applying this standard, it is relevant that the treatment
is in breach of representations made by the host State
which were reasonably relied on by the Claimant.”69

The divergence between Glamis Gold and Waste Management II can be attributed to the divergent approaches
taken by the tribunals to determine the status of CIL.
While it is well-accepted that CIL evolves from consistent
state practice, most tribunals have relied on the opinions of
63. While the original provision does not specifically mention customary international law, in 2001, the NAFTA Free Trade Commission issued a Note of
Interpretation limiting the FET obligation to that required under CIL. See
NAFTA Free Trade Commissions, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions (July 31, 2001). Dominican Republic-Central AmericaUnited States Free Trade Agreement, 19 U.S.C.S. §4011, art. 10.5 (2005)
[hereinafter CAFTA].
64. Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Award, ¶ 22
(June 8, 2009).
65. Neer v. Mexico, 4 R.I.A.A. 60 (1926).
66. Glamis Gold, ¶ 616.
67. See, e.g., Merrill & Ring Forestry L.P. v. Canada, NAFTA, UNCITRAL,
ICSID Administered Case 2, ¶ 213 (Mar. 31, 2010).
68. See id. ¶ 208.
69. Waste Mgmt. v. Mexico (Waste Mgmt. II), NAFTA ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/00/03, ¶ 98 (2004).
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scholars and previous tribunal awards to demonstrate the
evolved status of CIL.70
To prevent overly broad interpretations of the minimum
standard of treatment under CIL, the TPP negotiators
have included an annex stating that CIL “results from a
general and consistent practice of States that they follow
from a sense of legal obligation.”71 Limiting CIL to consistent state practice should place the burden on investors to
demonstrate that consistent state practice reflects that the
CIL standard has evolved. As noted in 2009 by the tribunal in Cargill v. Mexico, “surveys of State practice are difficult to undertake and particularly difficult in the case of
norms such as ‘fair and equitable treatment’ where developed examples of State practice may not be many or readily accessible.”72 The difficulty in ascertaining state practice
was also discussed in Glamis Gold and accounted for the
tribunal’s finding that the standard had not evolved.73
Consequently, constraining CIL to consistent state practice would likely prevent investors from successfully arguing that the FET obligation has evolved.
Unfortunately, experience under CAFTA suggests that
the TPP 2015 Annex will be ineffective in constraining
CIL to consistent state practice. CAFTA Annex 10-B also
clarifies that CIL evolves from consistent state practice.74
Notwithstanding that treaty provision, in 2012 in Railroad Development Corp. (RDC) v. Guatemala, the tribunal
determined that CIL has evolved based on the case law
of previous arbitral awards.75 RDC initiated arbitration
under CAFTA after Guatemala terminated a 50-year contract granting RDC the right to use railway equipment on
its determination that the contract was not in the interest
of the state.76 The tribunal acknowledged CAFTA Annex
10-B, but went on to criticize the strict standard applied
in Glamis Gold, noting that the Neer award was not based
on an analysis of consistent state practice.77 The tribunal
found arbitral awards to be “an efficient manner for a party
. . . to show what it believes to be the law.”78 On this basis,
the tribunal adopted the broad standard applied in Waste
Management II, and found that Guatemala had violated its
FET obligation.79 Consequently, without textual guidance,
it is likely that the broad definition of the FET obligation
will continue to be applied under the TPP.
70. See Matthew C. Porterfield, A Distinction Without a Difference? The Interpretation of Fair and Equitable Treatment Under Customary International Law by
Investment Tribunals, IISD Investment Treaty News, Mar. 22, 2013. See,
e.g., CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8,
¶¶ 267-68,
71. TPP Investment Chapter, supra note 3, Annex II-A Customary International Law (Jan. 20, 2015 draft).
72. Cargill v. Mexico, NAFTA ICSID No. ARB(AF)/05/02, Award (Sept. 18,
2009).
73. Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Award, ¶¶ 202604 (June 8, 2009).
74. CAFTA, supra note 63, Annex 10-B.
75. See Railroad Dev. Corp. (RDC) v. Guatemala, CAFTA ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/23, Award, ¶¶ 213-18 (2012).
76. Id. ¶¶ 30-37.
77. Id. ¶ 216.
78. Id. ¶ 217.
79. Id. ¶¶ 218-19.
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Particularly important in the context of climate change
is whether the minimum standard under CIL has evolved
to include an obligation not to undermine investors’
legitimate expectations. Legitimate expectations claims
are based on the principle that where government actions
create expectations in the minds of investors, it is unfair
for a state to change laws in such a way that frustrates the
expectations it helped to create.80 In the context of climate
change, these claims are particularly concerning because
where climate regulations increase costs or frustrate investments, foreign investors may argue that the regulations violate their legitimate expectations of profit.81 For example,
such suits may arise where emissions standards result in
early retirement of coal-fired power plants because they
are unable to achieve newly imposed GHG emissions standards. If such a claim is successful, a host state would be
required to compensate the investor for the expected profits
had the plant continued to operate.
The principle of legitimate expectations has been one
of the most contentious issues in interpreting and applying the FET obligation.82 In its most expansive form, the
principle of legitimate expectations has been interpreted to
require a stable legal and business framework. In Tecnicas Medioambientales v. United Mexican States (“Tecmed”),
the tribunal found that FET requires host countries to act
such that investors “know beforehand any and all rules and
regulations that will govern its investment, as well as the
goals and the relevant policies and administrative practices
or directives, to be able to plan its investment and comply
with such regulations.”83 The tribunal found that Mexico
had undermined Tecmed’s legitimate expectations when it
refused to renew a one-year permit to operate a hazardous
waste facility due to public health concerns.84 Although
this aspect of the award has been criticized for “holding
states to an unrealistically high standard,” it has been cited
by a number of subsequent tribunals.85 This interpretation
of FET as seen in Tecmed would create a high level of risk
of liability for climate-related regulations.
Confining the FET obligation to the minimum standard of treatment under CIL has not prevented a number of
NAFTA and CAFTA tribunals from including legitimate
expectations as part of the FET standard.86 Even Glamis
Gold states that legitimate expectations are relevant to the
FET analysis.87 When the tribunal reiterates the Neer stan-

dard toward the end of the opinion, it states that a breach
of the FET standard under NAFTA “may be exhibited by
a ‘gross denial of justice or manifest arbitrariness falling
below acceptable international standards;’ or the creation
by the State of objective expectations in order to induce investment and the subsequent repudiation of those expectations.”88
This is particularly surprising since there is no support for
this determination in the Neer award.89
Limiting FET to CIL has, however, generally prevented
tribunals from taking the far-reaching approach seen in
Tecmed. Glamis Gold and other NAFTA tribunals addressing legitimate expectations have found that in order for
expectations to be legitimate, a claimant must have reasonably relied on representations made by the host state.90
Requiring specific assurances has thus far prevented a tribunal from finding that investors may reasonably expect
that laws and policies will remain stable throughout the
duration of their investment.91 However, just as with
expropriation, the protection afforded by the FET obligation depends on the tribunal’s decision as to what types of
representations an investor may reasonably rely on.92
Moreover, the continued evolution of CIL may result in
a broader interpretation of legitimate expectations in future
awards.93 Where awards such as RDC and Waste Management II have already weakened the distinction between the
FET standard confined to CIL and the autonomous treaty
standard, an adoption of the Tecmed approach would simply be another step in this direction. Investors are certainly
advocating for this expansion, as they have continued to cite
Tecmed as support for the inclusion of legitimate expectations in the FET obligation under NAFTA and CAFTA.94
If tribunals are willing to determine the status of CIL on
the basis of arbitration awards, the number of tribunals
that have accepted the Tecmed approach may serve as evidence of the standard’s evolution. Tribunals could further
rationalize the adoption of the Tecmed approach because
the Tecmed tribunal equated the FET standard with international law and rested its interpretation of the standard on
the Neer award and a NAFTA tribunal award.95
In sum, limiting the FET obligation to CIL may be
insufficient to effectively shield host states from the risk of
liability for climate change measures. Despite the inclusion
of similar language in NAFTA and CAFTA, tribunals
have relied on previous awards for determining the status

80. Salacuse, supra note 58, at 232.
81. Firger & Gerrard, supra note 34, at 544.
82. Patrick Dumberry, The Protection of Investors’ Legitimate Expectations and the
Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard Under NAFTA Article 1105, J. Int’l
Arb. 47, 48 (2014).
83. Tecmed, supra note 33, Award ¶¶ 153-54.
84. Id.
85. Moloo & Jacinto, supra note 59, at 47 (citing, e.g., MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd
& MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, at
114 (May 25, 2004), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca).
86. While NAFTA case law does not make clear whether legitimate expectations
is an element under the FET obligation, it suggests that an investor’s legitimate expectation is at least a factor to be considered. See, e.g., Waste Mgmt.
v. Mexico (Waste Mgmt. II), NAFTA ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/03,
¶ 98 (2004); Dumberry, supra note 82, at 61-62.
87. Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Award, ¶ 621
(June 8, 2009).

88. Id. ¶ 627 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
89. Dumberry, supra note 82, at 60.
90. Glamis Gold, ¶ 621. See also Dumberry, supra note 82, at 65-66. Some tribunals have even required that the representations have been made for the
purpose of inducing the investment. See, e.g., Mobil Investments Canada
Inc. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/4, ¶ 152 (May 22, 2012);
Glamis Gold, ¶ 621.
91. The Glamis tribunal explicitly rejected the Tecmed approach. See Glamis
Gold, ¶ 813 (“A claimant cannot have a legitimate expectation that the host
country will not pass legislation that will affect it.”).
92. See, e.g., Parkerings v. Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award, ¶ 331
(Sept. 11, 2007) (stating that assurances from a host-state may be implicit).
93. Railroad Dev. Corp. (RDC) v. Guatemala, CAFTA ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/23, Award, ¶ 218 (2012).
94. RDC, ¶ 156; Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, NAFTA/UNCITRAL,
Award, ¶ 568 (June 8, 2009).
95. Tecmed, supra note 33, at 152-55.
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of CIL instead of requiring a showing of consistent state
practice. This practice has allowed tribunals to determine
that the FET obligation has evolved to a much more stringent standard. If tribunals initiated under the TPP follow
a similar practice, host states may be at risk of liability for
the development of climate change regulations. TPP negotiators could reduce this risk by including more specific
language as to what standard of conduct the FET obligation imposes.
For example, the text could explicitly state that the
FET standard does not include a commitment to respect
investors’ legitimate expectations. Further, the text could
improve predictability and consistency by explicitly providing what responsibilities are included under the FET
standard. Alternatively, the text could require a written
commitment to find a violation of legitimate expectations,
as seen in the proposed annex for expropriation. This is
unlikely, however, because tying the obligation to CIL is
intended to allow the standard to evolve over time with
state practice. Alternatively, the FET provisions could
explicitly state that it is the burden of the investor to demonstrate that a state has violated CIL based on evidence
of actual state practice and opinio juris, and that arbitral
awards and secondary sources are insufficient to meet
that burden.96 However, without the right of appeal, there
would be no means for governments to challenge an award
if a tribunal were to determine the status of CIL on the
basis of arbitral awards.
It is worth noting that there are a few characteristics
of climate change that can aid host countries defending
against a FET claim for climate-related measures. First,
host countries may argue that investors do not have legitimate expectations that climate change regulations would
not be implemented. Host countries may point to existing
international agreements under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)97 and
numerous domestic laws and policies as indicators that
such measures were imminent. The intensive publicity surrounding climate regulation over the past several years also
means that the adoption of such regulation should hardly
come as a surprise.
In addition, host countries may be able to point to the
TPP itself. The leaked version of the environment chapter
provides a section entitled “Trade and Climate Change”
in which the Parties “acknowledge climate change as a
global concern that requires collective action and recognize the importance of implementation of their respective commitments under the UNFCCC and its legal
instruments.”98 The section recognizes “the role that
market and non-market approaches can play in achieving climate change objectives” and notes international
96. Porterfield, supra note 70, at 5.
97. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 1771
U.N.T.S. 107; S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-38; U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (Part
II)/Add.1; 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992).
98. Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade and Globalization Agreement, Environment
Chapter draft text [hereinafter TPP Environment Chapter SS.15 (Nov. 24,
2013 draft; leaked Jan. 2014), https://wikileaks.org/tpp-enviro/.
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efforts currently underway to increase energy efficiency,
promote sustainable transport and infrastructure, and
develop adaptation actions.99 This provision suggests that
a reasonable investor would expect the development of
climate regulations.100 Where measures to address climate change have long been on the horizon, tribunals
should not protect as “legitimate” any expectation to continue business-as-usual practices.
Likewise, the strong scientific consensus surrounding
climate change will aid host countries in defending challenged climate regulations. In applying the FET standard,
tribunals assess whether the host country relied on legitimate scientific evidence as the basis for the measure.101 In
addition, tribunals have linked legitimate expectations with
the issue of whether the measure was enacted for a proper
purpose.102 The reports of the IPCC—the officially constituted international body with the responsibility to gather
and assess scientific evidence on this issue—certainly provide an ample basis. The most recent IPCC report states
that evidence of the warming climate is “unequivocal” and
that limiting climate change will require “substantial and
sustained reductions of greenhouse gas emissions.”103 Host
countries can point to the dangers of climate change as
evidence of a measure’s proper purpose.
While the strong scientific underpinning of climate science will aid host countries in defending climate-related
measures, tribunals will still look for underlying protectionist purposes.104 For example, in S.D. Myers v. Canada,
the tribunal concluded that Canada’s ban on the export of
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) violated the FET standard where there was evidence of protectionist motives in
addition to the environmental rationale.105 Consequently,
host countries should be sure to design regulations to minimize discrimination against foreign investors where it is
not necessary to serve climate change goals.

C.

National Treatment

National treatment provisions are intended to prevent host
countries from favoring domestic investors. Under the
TPP, states must accord treatment to foreign investors “no
less favorable” than that provided to domestic investors “in
like circumstances.”106 The national treatment provisions
apply to actions a state takes “with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct,
99. Id. at SS.15.2-3 (Nov. 24, 2013 draft).
100. The United States has submitted a counterproposal that replaces the climate
change language with the need to move to a “low-emissions economy.” Despite the removal of the term “climate change,” this language could accomplish the same end, since the agreement to work toward a “low-emissions
economy” should also signal to investors that emissions reductions regulations are likely.
101. Moloo & Jacinto, supra note 59, at 54.
102. See Tecmed, supra note 33, ¶ 157.
103. IPCC, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis Report,
Summary for Policy Makers (2013).
104. Moloo & Jacinto, supra note 59, at 54.
105. See S.D. Myers v. Canada, NAFTA UNCITRAL (2002).
106. See TPP Investment Chapter, supra note 3, art. II.4 (Jan 20, 2015 draft).
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operation, and sale or other disposition of investments in
its territory.”107
National treatment provisions may be invoked to challenge climate-related measures that limit the import or
export of carbon-intensive fuels or favor domestic energy
sources because of lower associated GHG emissions. The
success of these claims is primarily dependent on what constitutes “like circumstances.” The leaked draft of the TPP
provides no guidance for construing the term. Under existing IIAs, tribunals have generally adopted the “regulatory
context” approach, which takes into account environmental and health policy objectives in determining whether
investors are in “like circumstances.”108 Most tribunals
follow the S.D. Myers tribunal and place the burden on
the regulating entity to show that the discrimination was
“reasonable” based on public policy objectives.109 But some
tribunals, such as in Methanex, have taken a more discerning approach, only comparing the foreign investors to an
identical domestic competitor.110
Under both approaches, if climate regulations differentiate among sources or products for the purpose of reducing emissions, then the investors should not be considered
to be “in like circumstances.”111 However, there is an additional risk under the majority approach, because even where
policy objectives are reasonable, the tribunal may still find
that the regulations are not a reasonable way to achieve
those objectives. For example, in S.D. Myers, the tribunal
found that although Canada’s goal of maintaining the ability to process PCBs within the country was legitimate, the
ban was not a permissible way to achieve it.112 While S.D.
Myers suggests that a very restrictive measure, such as an
import or export ban, is more likely to be deemed unreasonable than a less-restrictive measure, arbitral practice
does not clarify how middle-of-the-road policies will fare.
Consider, for example, California’s Low Carbon Fuel
Standard (LCFS), a market mechanism that requires providers of petroleum-based transportation fuels to reduce
the carbon intensity of their products.113 As part of the carbon intensity determination, the California Air Resources
Board (CARB) assigned default intensity figures for different fuels based on their place of origin. Taking into
account the place of origin was part of CARB’s effort to
accurately reflect the fuels’ life-cycle GHG emissions, since
GHGs are generated in transporting the fuel from where it
is produced to the filling stations where it is sold. If a host
country were to adopt a similar program (or any program
that disfavored sellers of foreign fuels because of associated
emissions) after the ratification of the TPP, foreign fuel
107. Id. art. II.4.1-2.
108. See Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn, Nondiscrimination in Trade and
Investment Treaties: Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?, Am. J. Int’l
L. 48, 76 (2008).
109. Id.
110. Methanex v. United States, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, ¶ 19 (Aug. 9, 2005),
available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/.
111. Moloo & Jacinto, supra note 59, at 57.
112. S.D. Myers v. Canada, NAFTA UNCITRAL (2002), ¶ 255.
113. See California Air Res. Bd. (CARB), Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS),
http://www.energy.ca.gov/low_carbon_fuel_standard/.
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producers could argue that taking the origin of a fuel into
account violated national treatment provisions.
Under the primary interpretation of national treatment, a tribunal would likely find that achieving emissions
reductions is a legitimate goal.114 However, because the
LCFS specifically assigned carbon-intensity figures based
in part on the fuels’ place of origin, a tribunal could conceivably find that the structure of the program was not a
legitimate way to achieve that goal, as it did with respect to
Canada’s PCB ban in S.D. Myers. The odds of such an outcome would be reduced if the LCFS were based on mileage rather than on national boundaries. For example, if
an LCFS were adopted by the United States that treated
fuel that is transported 2,000 miles the same regardless of
whether it was produced in the United States, Canada, or
Mexico, an argument based on the national treatment obligation would have little force.
It is important to note that while the regulatory context
approach is the dominant approach used in determining
what constitutes “like circumstances,” without any textual requirements, tribunals initiated under the TPP may
choose to adopt a different approach that does not take
into account public interest objectives. In rare cases, past
tribunals have disfavored the regulatory context approach
and instead adopted the approach utilized in World Trade
Organization (WTO) jurisprudence, which focuses on
whether or not goods are in a competitive relationship,
largely ignoring public policy concerns.115 For example, the
tribunal in the 2007 award Occidental Exploration & Prod.
Co. v. Republic of Ecuador compared all exporters regardless of the sector.116 The TPP could avoid Party liability for
climate change regulation by clarifying that investments
are not in like circumstances where there is a legitimate
public policy purpose for treating them differently and the
differential treatment serves that goal. Alternatively, the
TPP could include text similar to the police powers exception for indirect expropriation.

D.

MFN

The MFN treatment obligation prohibits preferential treatment of investors from one Party to the agreement over
114. Cf. Rocky Mtn. Farmers Union v. Corey, No. 12-15131 (9th Cir. Sept.
18, 2013), (determining that CARB’s consideration of geography was permissible because it was for the purpose of accounting for GHG emissions
involved in transporting the fuel).
115. DiMascio & Pauwelyn, supra note 108, at 71. The General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has a General Exceptions provision allowing states to adopt and implement measures that serve certain specified legitimate goals, including measures “necessary to protect human, animal or
plant life or health,” or “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources,” provided the measures “are not applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
international trade.” See GATT 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153
(1994).
116. Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case
No. UN3467, Award, ¶ 176 (July 1, 2004) (“[N]o exporter ought to be put
in a disadvantageous position compared to other exporters”), available at
http://www.italaw.com/cases/761.
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another.117 In requiring equitable treatment of investors
from all Member States, the TPP utilizes the same “like
circumstances” language as the national treatment provision.118 Thus, the risk of liability mirrors that of the national
treatment obligation, with one added concern. Tribunals
have almost unanimously interpreted MFN provisions to
allow foreign investors to import more favorable provisions
from the host country’s other IIAs under the rationale that
IIAs themselves can be discriminatory if they give certain
foreign investors access to more favorable ISDS rules.119
The TPP anticipates this issue by clarifying that the MFN
provision does not encompass ISDS procedures,120 but the
treaty fails to prevent the import of other provisions, such
as favorably worded FET provisions.121 Where the TPP
constrains the FET and indirect expropriation standards
beyond previous IIAs, a foreign investor may try to invoke
a more-expansive standard under an alternate IIA. Thus, it
is important that the TPP clarify that the MFN provision
may not be used to import any provision from another IIA.
In sum, while tribunals initiated under existing IIAs
have taken a more consistent approach toward national
treatment and MFN obligations than they have toward
indirect expropriation and FET obligations, there is at
least some risk of liability for climate change regulations
under all investor protection provisions. The interpretative
annexes included in the draft investment chapter are an
improvement, but may be insufficient to fully shield climate change actions from resulting in liability, especially
regulations that disfavor fuels or products based on their
place of origin. Moreover, even if the interpretative annexes
and other guidance language incorporated in the TPP help
governments defend challenges to climate-related measures, they may not prevent investors from initiating arbitration. Investors might still feel encouraged to bring suits
in hopes of a favorable outcome, or to use the threat of
liability to inhibit implementation of climate-related measures or obtain settlements.

III. Preserving Flexibility for Climate
Regulation
In addition to clarifying the investor protection standards
themselves, the TPP negotiators could preserve flexibility
for climate regulations by including general safeguard provisions. First, the TPP could include an environmental or
climate-specific exception clause. Second, the treaty could
include a provision that protects measures adopted in compliance with other international obligations. The draft text
fails to include either of these safeguards, and there has
117. TPP Investment Chapter, supra note 3, art. II.5 (Jan. 20, 2015 draft).
118. Id.
119. See Impregilo v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, ¶ 108
(June 21, 2011); White Indus. v. India, UNICTRAL, Final Award, §11.2
(Nov. 30, 2011).
120. TPP Investment Chapter, supra note 3, art. II.5.3 (Jan. 20, 2015 draft).
121. Cf. MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. & MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, ¶ 104 (May 25, 2004) (stating that MFN may be
used in construing a Party’s FET obligation).
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been no public indication that negotiators intend to add
such provisions.

A.

Environmental Exception Clause

An environmental exception clause is a general provision
that excuses governments from treaty obligations where
the challenged measures were taken for environmental
purposes. For example, GATT Article XX provides an
exception clause for measures that, among other things,
are “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health.”122 Short of a general environmental exception
clause, the TPP could explicitly enumerate a set of climaterelated measures that constitute legitimate public policies
and would excuse violations of investor protection provisions.123 The leaked draft of the investment chapter does
neither. While the environmental chapter recognizes the
role of “market and non-market approaches” in combating
climate change, it does not relieve such approaches from
risk of creating governmental liability.124
The draft text does include proposed language meant
to preserve Parties’ rights to implement environmental
protection measures. The leaked investment chapter provides that: “Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to
prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining, or enforcing
any measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it
considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in
its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental . . . concerns.”125
While this provision seems to prioritize environmental
concerns, it does not function as an environmental exception. NAFTA contains similar text,126 and it has not prevented tribunals from finding that government measures
intended to protect the environment violate investor protection provisions.127 One possible reason is that the provision limits its reach to measures “otherwise consistent with
this Chapter.” This language makes clear that environmental regulations are subject to investor protection provisions.
Consequently, while this provision rhetorically supports
environmental concerns, it still prioritizes the interests of
foreign investors.
As an alternative to a general exception provision, the
TPP could provide a safe haven provision that would allow
dismissal of a claim where parties determine that a challenged measure was a good-faith climate mitigation or
adaptation measure. Such a provision could be modeled
on the U.S. Model BIT, which includes a similar provision
for financial services. The Model BIT provides a general
provision stating that, “no party shall be prevented from
adopting or maintaining measures relating to financial
122. To invoke a general exception under GATT Article XX, the Member State
must also comply with good-faith provisions under the Chapeau of Article
XX. See GATT 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994).
123. Firger & Gerrard, supra note 34, at 561-62.
124. TPP Environment Chapter, supra note 98, at §15.2-3.
125. TPP Investment Chapter, supra note 3, art. 12.15.
126. NAFTA, supra note 11, at 605, 642, ch. 11, art. 1114(1).
127. See, e.g., Tecmed, supra note 33; Metalclad v. Mexico, NAFTA ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (2000).
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services for prudential reasons . . . .”128 However, instead
of leaving it to the discretion of the tribunal to make this
determination, the text goes on to establish a mechanism
by which the competent financial authorities of both parties are given 120 days to address the issue.129 If the issue
is unresolved within the designated time period, the case
proceeds to arbitration.130
The TPP could implement a similar safe haven measure
for environmental, or more specifically, climate change
regulation. In response to an ISDS claim, the provision
could allow a state to raise a defense that the challenged
measure was intended to mitigate or adapt to climate
change, and give a certain period of time for the relevant
environmental authorities of the host state and the investor’s home state to determine whether the measure was
in good faith. If the parties come to an agreement, then
the claim cannot proceed. If there is no agreement, the
tribunal cannot raise any negative inference regarding
the failure to reach an agreement. This type of provision
is more advantageous than a simple exception provision,
because it allows parties to retain authority to prioritize
climate regulation, instead of being subject to the whims
of a tribunal.
The leaked draft of the TPP does not contain an environmental or climate exception. The closest the draft text
came to an environmental exception was the proposed
annex that prevents finding an indirect expropriation for
legitimate environmental regulations; however, this clause
does not extend to the FET, MFN, or national treatment obligations. Nor is it clear that this proposal will be
adopted over the alternate proposals that include the “rare
circumstances” language.

B.

Competing International Obligations

International climate instruments adopted pursuant to the
UNFCCC impose binding obligations on some states to
reduce GHG emissions. Further international agreements
will likely evolve either through UNFCCC negotiations
or external bilateral and multilateral agreements such as
the U.S.-China agreement to phase down HFCs.131 Where
compliance with obligations under climate change agreements requires governments to change legal frameworks or
promulgate new regulations that frustrate foreign investments, compliance may put a Party at risk of liability under
TPP investor protection provisions.
To prevent such circumstances, other IIAs have included
provisions addressing inconsistent obligations. For example, the U.S.-Korea FTA (KORUS) provides:
128. United States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), art. 20 (2012),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20
Meeting.pdf.
129. Id. art. 20(3)(c).
130. Id. art. 20(3)(e).
131. Press Release, White House, United States and China Agree to Work Together on Phase Down of HFCs (June 18, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2013/06/08/united-states-and-china-agree-work-togetherphase-down-hfcs.
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In the event of any inconsistency between a Party’s obligations under this Agreement and a covered agreement,
the Party shall seek to balance its obligations under both
agreements, but this shall not preclude the Party from
taking a particular measure to comply with its obligations under the covered agreement, provided that the primary purpose of the measure is not to impose a disguised
restriction on trade.132

Although this balancing test does not completely
remove the risk of liability, it clearly states that a Party
shall not be precluded from complying with other international obligations.
The TPP environment chapter does not include any
such provision addressing obligations inconsistent with
international environmental agreements. The “Climate
Change and Trade” article in the leaked environmental
section only notes that international efforts are underway
to address climate change.133 A country could point to this
provision to demonstrate that an international obligation is
legitimate; however, tribunals have discretion to determine
how international obligations impact the analysis of investor protection provisions.
While the relevant cases are limited, it appears that
tribunals have been unwilling to find that obligations
under non-investment treaties relieve a host country
from liability under investor protection provisions.134 In
S.D. Myers, Canada argued that it had implemented its
export ban on PCBs pursuant to its obligations under
the Basel Convention.135 The Convention prohibits the
export of hazardous wastes, including PCBs, to nonparties (such as the United States) without a bilateral agreement, and requires Parties to ensure the availability of
adequate disposal facilities for the environmentally sound
management of hazardous wastes. After discussing the
obligations of the Basel Convention at length, the tribunal found there was no legitimate environmental reason
for Canada’s ban.136 While this finding was based on concerns of protectionist intent, the inclusion of a provision
like the one in KORUS would at least require the tribunal to explicitly grapple with the competing motivations
behind the measure.
International obligations were also at issue in Santa
Elena v. Costa Rica, which arose when Costa Rica expropriated foreign investor property to preserve a unique ecological site under international environmental agreements
including the Convention Concerning the Protection of
132. Free Trade Agreement Between the Republic of Korea and the United States
of America, ch. 20, art. 20.10.3 (June 30, 2007, modified, Dec. 5, 2010),
available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/
korus-fta/final-text.
133. TPP Environment Chapter, supra note 98, at SS.15.
134. See Miles, supra note 55, at 82.
135. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, 1673 U.N.T.S. 126, 28 I.L.M. 657 (1989).
136. S.D. Myers v. Canada, NAFTA UNCITRAL, ¶ 195 (2002) (“Insofar as
there was an indirect environmental objective—to keep the Canadian industry strong in order to assure a continued disposal capability—it could
have been achieved by other measures.”).
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the World Cultural and Natural Heritage.137 The tribunal
refused to take into account conservation obligations in
determining the land value for compensation purposes.138
Santa Elena and S.D. Myers highlight the importance of
including a provision to address competing international
obligations. Without such a provision, the TPP may put
Parties in a position where they are unable to comply with
emissions reduction obligations due to the risk of liability
to investors.

IV.

The ISDS Mechanism

In addition to investor protection provisions, the structure
of arbitration may also contribute to host countries’ vulnerability to liability for actions taken to combat climate
change. ISDS has been heavily criticized for lack of consistency and transparency in arbitral awards and the considerable costs that states are forced to bear.139 For example,
South Africa cited “uncertainty and the unacceptable risk”
in its decision not renew its BIT with the Belgo-Luxemberg Economic Union.140 Such concerns have led a number
of scholars and the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD) to propose pathways to
reforming ISDS.141 The European Commission has issued
a factsheet outlining how the Commission intends to
address these concerns in future agreements and has initiated a public consultation on the issue.142 This section will
briefly discuss characteristics of ISDS that contribute to
the vulnerability of public interest regulations and analyze
whether the TPP sufficiently addresses them. It concludes
that, aside from proposals to improve transparency, the
leaked draft of the TPP essentially replicates the structure
of the ISDS mechanism adopted in past agreements.

A.

Transparency and Opportunity to Submit Amicus
Briefs

Based on the firm-to-firm mode of arbitration, in which
private arbitration was seen as critical to protecting commercial interests, ISDS has traditionally lacked trans137. Compania del Desarallo de Santa Elena, S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica, 39
I.L.M. 1317, 1325 (2000); Convention Concerning the Protection of the
World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151; 27 U.S.T. 37;
11 I.L.M. 1358 (1972).
138. Santa Elena, 39 I.L.M. at 1329 (“[T]he purpose of protecting the environment for which the Property was taken does not alter the legal character of
the taking for which adequate compensation must be paid.”).
139. UNCTAD, Roadmap, supra note 4. See, e.g., Kyla Tienhaara, InvestorState Dispute Settlement in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Submission to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
5 (May 19, 2010), http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/tpp/submissions/
Documents/tpp_sub_tienhaara_100519.pdf; Jeswald W. Salacause, Is There
a Better Way? Alternative Methods of Treaty-Based, Investor-State Dispute Resolution, 51 Fordham Int’l L.J. (2007).
140. Open letter from Sidwell Medupe, supra note 23.
141. UNCTAD, Roadmap, supra note 4; see Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy
Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law
Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1521 (2004).
142. European Commission, Factsheet: Incorrect claims About Investor-State Dispute Settlement (Oct. 3, 2013), available at http://trade.
ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/october/tradoc_151790.pdf.
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parency and opportunities for members of the public to
submit amicus curiae briefs.143 Under the most commonly
employed procedures, ISDS proceedings are not open to
the public unless both parties agree, and investors usually
opt for closed hearings.144 Of the 85 cases arbitrated under
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules at the end of 2012 (the
most recent statistics available), only 18 were public.145
Occasionally, not only proceedings but also awards are
kept confidential.146
The lack of transparency and opportunity for participation is of particular concern because investment arbitration
has the capacity to affect public health and environmental
policy. While an investment arbitration case is at its core a
private dispute between the host state government and the
foreign investor, the disputes often center on public law,
such as the implementation of environmental regulation.147
Given the large awards seen in investment arbitration, the
threat of liability may deter host states from implementing regulations or lead to their repeal. For example, in
1997, Ethyl Corp., a manufacturer of the gasoline additive
methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl (MMT),
brought suit against Canada’s MMT import ban, claiming over $200 million in damages.148 Facing the potential
of significant public liability, Canada agreed to repeal the
ban in addition to making a payment of approximately US
$13.5 million.149
In this sense, investment arbitration differs from private commercial arbitration, which is less likely to affect
the implementation of public law.150 Because an ISDS
award may impact the public’s rights and interests, the
ISDS mechanism should be structured to ensure transparency and the opportunity for submissions of amicus briefs.
Transparency subjects awards to public scrutiny and is an
important check on the tribunals’ discretion.151 Acceptance
of amicus briefs gives interested parties the opportunity to
be heard.
The 2015 leaked investment chapter reveals a modest
improvement with respect to transparency. The negotiators rejected proposed language to make transparency subject to the consent of the disputing parties.152 In addition,
the negotiators adopted a provision proposed in the 2012
draft that requires tribunal documents including briefs
and awards to be available to the public, but again pro143. Tienhaara, supra note 139, at 5.
144. Id. at 6 (referring to International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention and the U.N. Commissions on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL)).
145. UNCTAD, Roadmap, supra note 4, at 3, n.8.
146. UNCTAD, Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement: IIA Monitor No. 1, at 1 (2009) (noting that only 20 of the 26
decisions that are known to have been issued in 2011 are publicly available).
147. See William W. Burke-White & Andreas Von Staden, Private Litigation in a
Public Law Sphere: The Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35
Yale J. Int’l L. 283, 288, 293-94 (2010).
148. Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, Notice of Arbitration (Apr. 14, 1997); Ethyl Corp.
v Canada, NAFTA UNCITRAL (1998).
149. Moloo & Jacinto, supra note 59, at 29.
150. Poirier, supra note 17, at 880.
151. Franck, supra note 141, at 1616-17.
152. Compare TPP Investment Chapter, supra note 3, art. 12.23.2 (2012 draft),
with TPP Investment Chapter, art. II.23.1 (Jan. 20, 2015 draft).
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vides procedures for protected information.153 Negotiators
also adopted a proposed provision that gives tribunals the
discretion to accept and consider amicus curiae submissions from a person who is not a disputing party, although
the text does not provide intervention as of right or mandatory acceptance of amicus briefs.154 The text also maintained the requirement, included in the previous leaked
draft, that tribunals conduct hearings open to the public,
with an exception allowing a tribunal to make “appropriate
arrangements” in the case of protected information.155

to persist. To address inconsistency in arbitral awards, a
number of scholars and politicians have advocated for the
development of an appellate mechanism for ISDS awards.163
In fact, recent U.S. FTAs have required that Parties consider the development of an appellate mechanism.164 The
leaked draft of the TPP does not make any such commitment. A proposed provision only requires parties to consider whether TPP awards would be subject to an appellate
mechanism, should such a mechanism be developed in the
future under other institutional arrangements.165

B.

C.

Consistency

Without formal principles of stare decisis or a centralized
appellate body, inconsistency has become a persistent problem in arbitral tribunals.156 As discussed above, tribunals
have been inconsistent both in interpreting treaty provisions and in assessing the merits of cases involving similar
facts.157 According to one scholar, “the lack of determinacy
and coherence in treaty arbitration has raised the specter of
a legitimacy crisis.”158 Inconsistency reduces the perceived
legitimacy of ISDS because it prevents states and private
parties from understanding and conforming to a desired
code of conduct.159 Moreover, unpredictability encourages
settlement and may lead to unnecessary government payouts or the repeal of public interest regulations to avoid a
burdensome award, as seen in Ethyl Corp.
The lack of transparency exacerbates inconsistency by
limiting a tribunal’s capacity to rely on a comprehensive
assessment of the case law.160 The ad hoc nature of tribunals and ambiguous investor protection provisions further
contribute to this problem.161 States facing inconsistent
decisions or mistakes of law have little recourse. Most tribunal procedures do not allow review of an award on its
legal merits.162
While TPP negotiators have attempted to reduce inconsistency in tribunal awards by clarifying investment protection provisions, the leaked text does not address the
structural characteristics of ISDS that allow inconsistency
153. TPP Investment Chapter, art. II.23 (Jan. 20, 2015 draft).
154. Id. art. II.22.3.
155. Id. art. II.23.2.
156. Awards rendered in investment arbitration are only binding on the parties
involved in the dispute. See, e.g., Tienhaara, supra note 139, at 5; Poirier,
supra note 17, at 518-19 (citing, e.g., the Statute of the International Court
of Justice. “The decision of the Court has no binding force except between
the parties and in respect of that particular case.” Statute of International
Court of Justice, art. 59 (June 26, 1945)); Joseph de Pencier, Investment,
Environment and Dispute Settlement: Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter
Eleven, 23 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 409, 924 (1999).
157. See UNCTAD, Roadmap, supra note 4, at 3; Franck, supra note 141, at
1558-82.
158. See Franck, supra note 141, at 1586.
159. See id. at 1602; Charles H. Brower II, Structure, Legitimacy, and NAFTA’s
Investment Chapter, 36 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 37, 52 (2003).
160. Of the 37 known ISDS tribunal decisions rendered in 2013, only 23 are in
the public domain. See UNCTAD, Recent Developments in Investor
State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), No. 1, 1 (Apr. 2014).
161. Tienhaara, supra note 139, at 5.
162. For example, under ICSID procedures a tribunal’s mistake of law or fact
cannot justify the annulment of an award because neither type of mistake is
an enumerated ground. See Franck, supra note 141, at 1547.

Compensation

At the heart of concerns over the chilling effect of ISDS
on public interest regulation is the size of ISDS awards. To
date, over $430 million has been paid to investors through
ISDS under U.S. FTAs alone.166 The dramatic increase in
ISDS disputes has increased the risk of liability. New cases
have jumped from a few per year in the late 1980s and
early 1990s to 30-45 new cases per year since 2003.167 At
least 46 new disputes were initiated in 2011 alone, marking
the highest number of known treaty-based disputes ever
filed in one year.168 In 2012, pending ISDS suits related to
environmental, public health, and transportation policies
demanded a total of $13 billion.169
With ISDS awards in the hundreds of millions (and even
billions) of dollars, the sheer magnitude allows investors to
“exert significant pressures on public finances and create
potential disincentives for public-interest regulations.”170
Adjusting the definition of investments subject to compensation could serve to provide meaningful investor protections without compromising host countries’ capacity to
regulate in the public interest. IIAs generally define investments broadly to include expectation of gain or profit.
The TPP mimics existing IIAs by defining investments
to include “every asset that an investor owns or controls,
163. E.g., Poirier, supra note 17, at 924; Franck, supra note 141, at 1617-25
(proposing the establishment of an independent, permanent appellate body
with the authority to review awards rendered under a variety of investment
treaties); UNCTAD, Roadmap, supra note 4, at 3. In granting the president
trade promotion authority in 2000, Congress required that future trade
agreements have “an appellate body or similar mechanism to provide coherence to the interpretation of investment provisions in trade agreements.” 19
U.S.C. §3802(b)(3)(G)(iv) (2000).
164. See, e.g., CAFTA, supra note 63, Annex 10-F (stating that “the FTC shall
establish a Negotiating Group to develop an appellate body or similar mechanism to review awards rendered by tribunals under the Investment Chapter of the Agreement”); United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, June 6,
2003, U.S.-Chile, ch. 22, Annex 10-H.
165. TPP Investment Chapter, supra note 3, art. II.22.10 (Jan. 20, 2015 draft)
(“In the event that an appellate mechanism for reviewing awards rendered by investor-State dispute settlement tribunals is developed in the
future under other institutional arrangements, the Parties shall consider
whether awards rendered under Article II.28 should be subject to that
appellate mechanism.”).
166. See Public Citizen, supra note 5.
167. UNCTAD, Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, IIA Issues Note No. 1, 2 (2012).
168. Id.
169. Memo from Lori Wallach and Todd Tucker, Public Citizen’s Global Trade
Watch, Public Interest Analysis of Leaked Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
Investment Text 2 (June 13, 2012).
170. UNCTAD, Roadmap, supra note 4, at 3.
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directly or indirectly, that has the characteristics of an
investment including such characteristics as the commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or
profit, or the assumption of risk.”171
This broad definition of investments entitles foreign
investors to compensation well beyond their domestic
counterparts. Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
governments generally shield themselves from liability for
their actions, with only narrow exceptions.172 For example,
U.S. takings law essentially limits compensation for regulatory takings to the loss of value of the real property taken.173 Consequently, the definition of investments under
IIAs puts governments at risk of liability for actions that
would otherwise be protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Excluding expectations of gain or profit
from recoverable damages would not only put foreign and
domestic investors on more equal footing in most jurisdictions, but would also limit investors’ ability to use the
threat of liability to prevent a country from implementing
climate change measures.174

D.

Congressional Oversight

Interestingly, Congress may play a role in ensuring that
the final draft of the TPP includes many of the important
reforms discussed above, especially with respect to transparency and consistency. In April 2015, key congressional
legislators unveiled a bipartisan bill to give the president
fast-track authority in negotiating the TPP.175 Fast-track
authority streamlines the approval process for the TPP
by only allowing Congress to approve or deny the agreement as a whole, without any amendments. A number of
major trade agreements have been enacted under fast-track
authority. The most recent grant of fast-track trade promotion authority was made in connection with a 2002 bill
and expired in 2007.176
Fast-track authority is critical to the success of the
TPP, because without it, the U.S. Senate could threaten
the agreement by proposing amendments or filibustering,
thereby preventing its ratification altogether. The fast-track
bill has faced substantial opposition from congressional
Democrats, who are concerned about ultimately limiting
Congress’ capacity to ensure that the agreement meets its
trade objectives on a range of policy issues, including labor,
the environment, and healthcare, especially without releasing the text to the public.177 Despite this opposition, the
171. TPP Investment Chapter, supra note 3, at 12-3 (Jan. 20, 2015 draft) (emphasis added).
172. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 11149.
173. Been & Beauvais, supra note 13, at 63.
174. Citizen and environmental groups have criticized the TPP’s broad definition of investment. See, e.g., Sierra Club, Raw Deal: How the Trans-Pacific
Partnership Could Threaten Our Climate 6; Public Citizen, supra note 5.
175. Jonathan Weisman, Deal Reached on Fast-Track Authority for Obama on
Trade Accord, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 2015.
176. Trade Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C. §§3803-3805 (2002).
177. See, e.g., Press Release: Senators Will Seek Approval of Measure Before Congress Completes Work on Fast Track Legislation (May 19, 2015). Press Release: DeLauro, Miller Lead 151 House Dems Telling President They Will
Not Support Outdated Fast Track for Trans-Pacific Partnership, available at
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Senate passed the fast-track bill on May 22.178 The bill then
moved to the U.S. House of Representatives, where it has
faced even stronger opposition.
In the proposed fast-track bill, Congress has outlined
a series of principal trade negotiating objectives. Among
these objectives are a series of guidelines to improve ISDS,
including: (1) enhancing opportunities for public input
in the formulation of government positions; (2) ensuring
transparency through public proceedings, submissions,
and decisions, while balancing the need to protect confidential and classified information; (3) establishing an
appellate body or similar mechanism to provide coherence;
(4) allowing for the acceptance of amicus curiae submissions; and (5) providing mechanisms to eliminate frivolous
claims and ensure efficient disposition of claims.179 A number of these goals, such as public proceedings, submissions,
and decisions, have already been adopted in the draft negotiating text; others, however, such as the establishment of
an appellate body or a means to eliminate frivolous claims,
are missing from the most recently leaked text. Because
congressional approval is critical for the TPP’s acceptance
by the United States, the inclusion of these goals in the
fast-track bill, if enacted, would likely bolster the chances
of their inclusion in the final TPP text.

V.

Conclusion

Avoiding catastrophic climate change will require governments to implement a broad range of policies to encourage the transition to a low-emissions economy. The TPP
may obstruct advancement of climate-related policies by
creating a risk of liability for measures that negatively
affect foreign investments. In some previous IIAs, tribunals have adopted broad interpretations of investor protection provisions that have resulted in host state liability for
a number of environmental policies. The leaked text of the
TPP investment chapter indicates that negotiators may be
attempting to rein in investor protection provisions and
instead protect host states’ rights to adopt laws and policies to promote public welfare. These reforms, along with
the characteristics of climate change (including a strong
scientific foundation demonstrating substantial risk and
increased international attention), suggest that a reasonable arbitral tribunal would not find that nondiscriminatory, good-faith climate change regulations violate investor
protection provisions.
However, the leaked text still leaves tribunals with substantial discretion to interpret its provisions. Given this
discretion and tribunals’ tendency to be sympathetic to
investors’ interests, states may still be at risk of liability
for legitimate climate change measures. The potential for
large awards, combined with inconsistent interpretation of
treaty provisions and lack of transparency and oversight,
http://delauro.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&
id=1455:delauro-miller-lead-151-house-dems-telling-president-they-willnot-support-outdated-fast-track-for-trans-pacific-partnership&Itemid=21.
178. Trade Act of 2015, H.R. 1314, 114th Cong. (2015).
179. Id. §102(b)(4)(G).
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aggravates the already troubling legal landscape for host
countries wishing to implement climate policies. While
the TPP includes proposals to address transparency concerns, it does little to improve consistency or constrain
large awards.
To prevent liability for climate-related measures, TPP
negotiators should structure the agreement to prevent investor protection provisions from being invoked to obstruct
legitimate mitigation and adaptation efforts. The negotiators could address this issue by including an environmental or climate-specific exception that extends to the entire
agreement. Short of a general exception provision, negotiators could improve interpretative guidance for investor
protection provisions. For indirect expropriation and the
FET obligation, the text could require proof of binding
and written commitments from the host country before a
tribunal can find that public interest regulations violated
an investor’s legitimate expectations. Alternatively, the text
could include this limitation only with respect to expropriation and instead provide that respect for legitimate expectations is not an element under the FET obligation at all. For
the MFN and national treatment obligations, interpretative guidance could clarify that investments with differing
impacts on climate change are not in “like circumstances.”

In addition, negotiators could reduce the risk of liability for climate change regulations by reforming the ISDS
mechanism. The leaked text already includes proposals to
improve transparency and provide opportunity to submit
amicus briefs. Other reforms could include the establishment of an appeals mechanism or removing lost profits
from compensable damages. TPP negotiators should assess
all options to determine what combination best preserves
foreign investor protections without compromising host
countries’ capacity to tackle climate change.180
Due to the confidentiality of the TPP negotiations, the
treaty’s full impact on climate-related policies is not yet
apparent. Once the full text of the agreement is released,
it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to amend the
text to address all vulnerabilities. Preventing dangerous
climate change is in the interest of all TPP nations, and it
is the responsibility of the TPP negotiators to learn from
the issues that have arisen under past agreements and to
ensure that the treaty will not interfere with host countries’ climate-related policies. The final agreement should
not only expand trade and international investment, but
also support all Member States in their efforts to combat
climate change.

180. It is important to note that the investment chapter is not the only portion
of the TPP that has implications for the future of climate policy. The treaty
could foster an expansion of U.S. liquefied natural gas exports, and could
limit the ability of governments to mandate “green purchasing” in government procurement contracts. However, these issues are beyond the scope of
the Article.
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